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STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The only issue in this appeal is whether defendant-appellant, 
J. William Wiscombef is bound by the recommendations of the Domestic 
Relations Commissioner regarding property settlement payments to 
plaintiff-respondent, RoseMary Wiscombe, because Mr. Wiscombe failed 
to make an objection or request for further hearing within five days 
of the entry of the Commissioner's recommendations, as required by 
Rule 8 (d), Rules of the Third Judicial District Court. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
This appeal involves interpretation of Rule 8, Rules of the 
Third Judicial District Court, which provides as follows: 
Rule 8 Domestic Relations Commissioner 
(a) A Domestic Relations Commissioner may 
be appointed for the purpose of assisting the 
court in domestic relations matters as directed 
by the court. 
(b) All domestic relations matters, includ-
ing orders to show cause, pretrial conferences, 
petitions for modification of a divorce decree, 
scheduling conferences, and all other applica-
tions for relief, except ex parte motions, shall 
be referred to the Domestic Relations Commission-
er before any hearing may be scheduled before 
the assigned District Court Judge, unless 
otherwise ordered by the assigned judge. 
(c) The Commissioner shall, after hearing 
any motion or other application for relief, 
recommend entry of an order thereon, and shall 
further make a written recommendation as to each 
matter heard. Should the parties not consent 
to the recommended order, the matter shall be 
referred for further disposition by the assigned 
judge. 
(d) Any party objecting to the recommended 
order or seeking further hearing before the 
assigned judge shall, within five (5) days of 
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the entry of the Commissioner's recommendations 
provide notice to the Commissioner's office and 
opposing counsel that the recommended order is 
not acceptable or that further hearing is 
desired. The Commissioner shall then refer the 
matter to the assigned judge for further hearing, 
conference or trial. If no objection or request 
for further hearing is made within five (5) days, 
said party shall be deemed to have consented to 
entry of an order in conformance with the 
Commissioner's recommendation. 
(e) All recommendations of the Commissioner 
accepted by the parties shall be presented to 
the court and opposing counsel pursuant to Rule 
4 of these Rules. All proposed judgments, orders 
and decrees must be approved as to form by the 
signature of the Commissioner before 
presentation to the assigned judge in the case. 
(f) Any party obtaining a temporary re-
straining order or other temporary order pending 
a hearing shall be responsible for obtaining 
from the assigned judge any extension thereof 
before the expiration date as may be necessary 
pending hearing before the Commissioner of the 
assigned judge. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a Judgment of the District Court requiring 
defendant-appellant, J. William Wiscombe (hereinafter "William") to 
pay back payments of a property settlement to plaintiff-respondent, 
RoseMary Wiscombe (hereinafter "RoseMary"), pursuant to a decree of 
divorce. William is asking this Court to reverse the Judgment. 
Course of Proceedings 
The order to show cause why William should not be required to 
pay back payments of a property settlement was first heard before 
the Third Judicial District Court Domestic Relations Commissioner, 
Sandra Peulerf on August 9, 1984. The Commissioner recommended that 
William be ordered to pay all unpaid property settlement payments 
required by the decree of divorce and to do what the divorce decree 
required him to do. 
The matter was again heard before District Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick on October lf 19 84. Judge Frederick found that William 
did not provide notice to the Commissioner's office and opposing 
counsel that Commissioner Peuler's recommendations were not 
acceptable within five (5) days of entry of the recommendations and, 
therefore, that William was deemed to have accepted the Commission-
er's recommendation, pursuant to Rule 8 (d) Rules of the Third 
Judicial District Court. 
Disposition 
Judge Frederick entered judgment, pursuant to the recommendation 
of Commissioner Peuler, awarding RoseMary the unpaid property 
settlement payments, requiring William to give RoseMary a mortgage 
on certain property to assure payment of the property settlement and 
awarding RoseMary $150 in attorneys' fees. 
William filed objections to the proposed Judgment which were 
heard before Judge Frederick and were overruled and denied. 
Statement of Facts 
The brief of defendant-appellant, J. William Wiscombe, 
misrepresents the facts with no support in the record and introduces 
material for the first time on appeal which was not a part of any 
record before the trial court. The true facts, as supported by the 
record, are as follows: 
A divorce decree was entered on June 23, 1981 (R. 115-120). At 
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the time of the divorce, the parties owned real property having a 
value of $780,200, based on estimates and appraisals provided by 
William (R. 85-91). The property consisted of a twenty-four unit 
apartment complex in Midvale, Utah, an eight unit apartment complex 
in Evanston, Wyoming, and the parties' residence in Holladay, Utah 
(Id., R. 100-101). In order to provide William with the necessary 
income to make child support payments, RoseMary agreed to take only 
the residence of the parties, having a value of approximately $110 ,000 , 
and to give William all of the rental properties (R. 100-101). 
Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the decree of divorce 
awarded the rental properties to William and the residence to RoseMary 
(R. 116-117) . The decree required that William pay the first mortgage 
on the residence, having a balance of approximately $52,800 and 
monthly payments of approximately $578 (R. 116). The decree 
specifically stated that this was a property settlement and that 
RoseMary would be entitled to only $1 per year as alimony (R. 118). 
After the divorce decree was entered, RoseMary sold the residence 
in Holladay on contract (Plaintiff1s Answers to Interrogatories 
attached to Appellant's Brief, addendum 3-6, and R. 231). The 
contract provided for a small down payment and for the buyers to 
make payments to RoseMary (Id.). The buyers did not assume the 
mortgage on the property and RoseMary is still liable for those 
payments (Id.). 
With the down payment from the sale of the residence in Holladay, 
RoseMary purchased a condominium in St. George, Utah, on May 15, 
19 82 (Id.). She used the payments from the property in Holladay to 
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make payments on the condominium (Id.). William continued to make 
the property settlement payments to RoseMary for over one year after 
she moved to St. George but he refused to continue the payments after 
RoseMary remarried in 1983 (R. 132 and 232). As a result of William's 
refusal to make the property settlement payments
 f RoseMary was unable 
to make the payments on her condominium and she was forced to lose 
the property (Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories attached to 
Appellant's Brief, addendum 8, and R. 232). When the Judgment was 
entered on October 19 , 1984, the unpaid property settlement payments 
totaled $8,411 (R. 131-132, R. 148). The amount due in property 
settlement payments is now more than twice that amount (calculation 
from R. 131-132). 
RoseMary served William with an Order to Show Cause to require 
him to make the property settlement payments (R. 133-135). Pursuant 
to the Rules of the Third Judicial District Court, the matter was 
heard before Domestic Relations Commissioner Sandra Peuler on August 
9, 1984 (R. 137). William argued that he should not be required to 
continue to make the property settlement payments to RoseMary because 
RoseMary had sold the property on contract and because she had 
remarried (R. 235-237). The Commissioner rejected William's arguments 
and recommended that RoseMary be awarded back payments of property 
settlement (R. 238-239, R. 137). 
The decree of divorce had ordered that William give RoseMary a 
mortgage or trust deed against the parties' rental property in 
Evanston, Wyoming (R. 117). William failed and refused to deliver 
such trust deed or mortgage (R. 132). RoseMary's attorney argued 
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to Commissioner Peuler that because William had taken out additional 
mortgages on the rental property in Evanston, there was no value left 
in that property and William should be required to give RoseMary a 
trust deed in the other rental property of the parties (R. 233). 
The Commissioner ruled that he should be required to give her a 
mortgage on the property in Evanstonf but if she wanted a mortgage 
on other properties she should bring a motion to modify the divorce 
decree (R. 239). 
William's attorney did not say at any time in the hearing before 
Commissioner Peuler that he did not accept the Commissioner's 
recommendations or that he desired a further hearing before the 
district court (R. 230-241). After the Commissioner stated her 
decision, the following statements were made: 
THE COURT (COMMISSIONER PEULER): Counsel, I'm 
not going to entertain further arguments. I've 
heard everything you had to say, and I think 
that the requirements of the decree need to be 
carried out. 
I'll ask you to discuss the recommendation 
with your clients, and let me know if you need 
a further setting. For your information, the 
case has been appointed to Judge Frederick. 
MR. MADSEN: Frederick? Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
(R. 241). 
Commissioner Peuler's clerk prepared a minute entry of the 
Commissioner's findings which included the following statements: 
Based on arguments of respective counsel 
Comm. recommended: 1) As long as pltf is 
obligated on mortgage payments, deft is obligated 
too. 
2) Pltf is entitled to judgments he hasn't 
made on that. 
3) Deft is obligated to do what divorce 
decree required him to do. 
Deft did not accept recommendation. 
(R. 137). 
Copies of this minute entry were not sent to the attorneys (Id.). 
On August 23, 1984, fourteen days after the entry of Commissioner 
Peuler's minute entry in favor of RoseMary, William's attorney filed 
a notice that the matter had been referred to District Judge J. 
Dennis Frederick for another hearing on the issues heard before 
Commissioner Peuler (R. 138). RoseMary objected to the hearing 
before Judge Frederick on the ground that notice of objections to 
the recommended order was not given to the Commissioner and to 
RoseMary's attorney within five (5) days of the entry of the 
Commissioner's ruling, as required by Rule 8 (d) of the Rules of the 
Third Judicial District Court (R. 142f 147-148). Judge Frederick 
sustained RoseMary's objections and ruled that he would enter judgment 
pursuant to Commissioner Peuler's recommendations (Id.). 
RoseMary's attorney then prepared a proposed Judgment pursuant 
to Commissioner Peuler's recommendations and sent it to Commissioner 
Peuler, along with an affidavit of RoseMary's attorney indicating 
he had spent a total of 17 hours and that a reasonable fee for his 
services would be $1,700 (R. 143-146). The Judgment also was supported 
by the affidavit of RoseMary in support of the Motion for Order to 
Show Cause, which established that William had failed to make payments 
in the sum of $6,662 as of July 20, 19 84, and he continued to fail 
and refuse to make payments of $583 per month (R. 131-132). 
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Commissioner Peuler filled in the sum of $150 for attorney's 
fees and signed the Judgment approving it as to form (R. 149). She 
then submitted the order to Judge Frederick and the order was signed 
by Judge Frederick on October 19, 1984 (Id.). 
William's attorney filed objections to the proposed Judgment 
in which he argued that the five day period in which to give notice 
of non-acceptance of the Commissioner's recommendations had not 
started to run and that the minute entry by Commissioner Peulerfs 
clerk, which was not sent to RoseMary's attorney, constituted notice 
to RoseMary's attorney that William did not accept the Commissioner's 
recommendations (R. 151-155). William's attorney did not claim in 
those objections to the proposed Judgment that he gave oral notice 
to the court and RoseMary's attorney that he would not accept the 
Commissioner's recommendations and he made no such claim until the 
appeal to the Supreme Court (Id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Rule 8 (d) of the Rules of the Third Judicial District Court 
requires that if a party objects to the recommendations of the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner or seeks further hearing before the 
district judge, the party must, within five days of the entry of the 
Commissioner's recommendations, provide notice to the Commissioner's 
office and opposing counsel that the recommendations are not 
acceptable or that further hearing is desired. If the party does 
not give such notice within five days he is deemed to have accepted 
the Commissioner's recommendations. The record is very clear that 
William and his attorney did not provide any such notice to the 
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the entry of the Commissioner * s r scommendati ons Therefore , W:i 3 ] i am 
is deemed to have consented to entry of an order in conformance with 
the Jtitjn ; -: . ' mendat :ii :: i: is. 
Will < *•- - r torr>?y cla ims that he gave oral notice to the 
Commit -: - """-^nMary * s attorney i n ::)i:: en court at the t i me of 
the iieai i -<• »eioie Commissioner Peulei that he won] d not accept the 
Commissioner *s recommendations ^~\d that further hearing was desired. 
T . sho IN s th at tl: :i:ii s zi] a i m i s fa ] se . 
No such notice was given. 
Wil1 i *•*•*'" attorn^^ * -» ^  • • »*• 'J ^ ^ M a n r ' q **• Forney had "acti lal 
o^ ^ons; *. «. 7^ nnf ^ . , t :: a• ::• 2e ]::: • t 11: 1 = • 
Commiss ioner ' -oomn n v i a t ion b e c a u s e Wil l iam, 1 s a t t o r n e y s e r v e d 
i e .} a f t e 1: t h e he a r I ini, 3 T h e 1 :< EIS i s 
no n o t i c e • J nt-er roga ; : . - 1 i a t Wi 1 1 i am woi ill d n o t a c c e p t t h e 
QnTn^- rjd • o n o v • <* r o p ^ m u p ^ a ^ 1 U l l g WJ. what he d e s i r e d a n o t h e r h e a r i n g 
be * - * - ^ -
I n a t temp ? * if- f a c t s - e s u i t h i s own p u r p o s e s , Wi~ " ' a r c ' s 
a H inni jv li'i1 111 nl< 1111 HIP n i us nri i s r p p r n sen t a t MUIS of fact w i t h mi s u p p o r t 
in I lie r e c o r d and t e p e a t e d l y r e t e r s lu addenda tu I n s b i i e l will 1 1 li 
a r e not a p a r t of t h e r e c o r d and were n e v e r a d m i t t e d in e v i d e n c e . 
W 1 II II 1 < 1 it in mi 1 1 I 11 mi n r ' •' ni mi 11 n 11 [ 11 M 1 in l i d r e p r e s 1 > n t 1 1 111111 Il II 11 I 1111 II 1 II 1 < • 
a f f i d a v i t s a nd d o c u m e n t s a t t a c h e d t o W i l l i a m ' s b r i e f which wer « =1; 1: l o t 
irie .died in t h e reroinil of t h e lower c o u r t s h o u l d be s t r i c k e n and n o t 
c o n . ^ d e r e d ny u u s C o u r t . 
'William's brief argues that Judge Frederick's Judgment is 
inconsistent with the recommendations by Commissioner Peuler. The 
Judgment is completely in conformity with the recommendations of the 
Commissioner and was approved by her. 
Although the issue of whether the Judgment was not correct on 
the merits is not properly before this Court, the evidence clearly 
establishes that the Judgment was correct and proper and that this 
appeal is merely another tactic for delay by William's attorney. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PURSUANT TO RULE 8 (d) OF THE RULES OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WILLIAM IS DEEMED TO 
HAVE CONSENTED TO THE COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDA-
TIONS BECAUSE HE FAILED TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF HIS 
REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THOSE RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN 
FIVE DAYS FROM THE ENTRY OF THE COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS. 
Rule 8 of the Rules of the Third Judicial District Court requires 
that all domestic relations matters be heard before the domestic 
relations commissioner before a hearing can be scheduled before th€> 
assigned district judge, unless otherwise ordered by the judge. 
After hearing the matters, the commissioner shall make 
recommendations. 
Rule 8 (d) of the Rules of the Third Judicial District Court 
provides: 
Any party objecting to the recommended order or 
seeking further hearing before the assigned judge 
shall, within five (5) days of the entry of the 
commissioner's recommendations provide notice 
to the commissioner' s office and opposing counsel 
that the recommended order is not acceptable or 
that further hearing is desired. The commission-
er shall then refer the matter to the assigned 
judge for fur ther t tearing, conference or trial, 
If no objection or request for further hearing 
is made within five (5) days f said party shall 
be deemed to have consented to entry of an order 
in conformance with the commissioner's 
recommendation. 
RoseMary f s order to Show Cause aga inst Wil liam for Wi ] 1 :i am'*' s 
f a i 1 u re to ma ke property s e 111 erne n t pay me n t s w a s t I e EIII :i : ii b € f: • : J : e 
Commissioner Peuler on August 9, 1 984, and Commissioner Peul er entered 
her i: ecommendr-i t 11 HI • in I m - i i I I'ns^M.n y thr n.wip In, , Wi] 1 i am's 
attorney il i il i m provide any notice that lit-* objected to the 
c omm i s s i one r * s r u 1 i ng o r th a t h e de s i r e d a f u r th e r h e a r i n g be £ o r e 
entry of Commissioner Peuler f s recommendatioi i. => Therefore , pu rsuant 
to Ri i] e 8 ( d) , Wi ] 1 i am 1 s deemed to have consented to entrj r of a 
J udgme n t i n a ceo r d a n c e w i t h C omm i s s i o n e i: P e u 1 e r * s r e c omme n d a t i o n s. 
W i ] ] i a inl s a 11 o r n e y n o w a dm i t s t h a t l:i e d :i d n o t f 1 1 e o r s e r v e 
upon: i RoseMacy i 11 Loin f iy liny wi il I MII II I 11 \-> I I M I In-1 winihl n I i MIISHIII. 
t o the c o m m i s s i o n e r ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s LuP lie c l a i m s , foi t h e f i r s t 
t iippr in I I, thiil In1 q.ivc ni il mil ifiir'at' ion t h . i t t he c o m m i s s i o n e r ' s 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s would no! be a c c e p t e d in open court, at I lie h e a l i n g 
b e f o r e Commissioner: P e u l e r , llll'li 1 t r a n s c r i p t of; t h e hear inq iaefore 
C o m m i s s i i jiiiiin m p i I I I I I M I - i h n w . i V M I V I h - M i ' l> 111.ml lllliii i I ' l l j i in i i n n l I n n 
The transcript of the hearing before Commissioner Peuler; con L a m s 
no statement- whatsoever to tho pffect th.it William wool ' -^ =» ^ ^ o t 
thp commissioner's recommendations, „, I ln-« part . 
let- the matter open at Mir.* (Mind uf the hearing. The transcript- ends 
\* I I n « I Il II i i I in 11 'i I 1 1 1 ( » m r Mil I H : 
THE COURT (COMMISSIONER PEULER): Counsel, I'm 
not going to entertain further arguments. I've 
heard everything you had to say, and I think 
that the requirements of the decree need to be 
carried out. 
I'll ask you to discuss the recommendation 
with your clients, and let me know if you need 
a further setting. For your information, the 
case has been appointed to Judge Frederick. 
MR. MADSEN: Frederick? Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
(R. 241). 
William's attorney now admits that the transcript of the hearing 
before Commissioner Peuler shows he did not give any oral notification 
in open court that he did not accept the commissioner's ruling. In 
order to avoid this obvious fact, the appellant's brief has included 
an unsigned affidavit of Commissioner Peuler which is not a part of 
the record and has made very strained arguments about the contents 
of the record and the transcript of the hearing. 
The unsigned affidavit of Commissioner Peuler is not a part of 
the record and should not be considered in this appeal. The evidence 
of what occurred at the hearing is very clearly set forth in the 
transcript of the hearing. The transcript clearly shows that William' s 
attorney gave no notice of objection to the commissioner's recommenda-
tions at the hearing. 
William's attorney next argues that the notation in the minute 
entry regarding Commissioner Peuler's recommendations, "Deft did not 
accept recommendation," indicates that William's attorney gave notice 
in open court that the recommendations would not be accepted and that 
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h e • i e s i r e d f 1 :i r t h e r h e a r i n g before t h e d I s t i: I c t c o u r t. 11 i s \ i n k n o w n 
why this notation i s i ": tl :ie recor d bi it i t did not result fr Dm a i: i/y 
statement in open cour t by Wi] liam 1s attorney. Wi 1 liam 1s attorney 
h e d i d n o t a c c e p t t h e r e c omme n d a t i o n b u !:  h e in a d e n o s u c h s t a t erne n t 
in open c o r • m ^wc -rpsence of A- • * ^^''''^ 
Wil- ^ orney , ._ . . , .. 
i<- ncomplete because * ^ >?s • ncl xle - * itemen- t:iat 
S U y Q e S 11» Lhrx • J £ e c u i J j i i g Hid C h x il t j illd v M -i v ^ u<r tr w y i <~*lUci u u t - x *• , L . * i. 
o f f *u ^ t m a y h ^ ? ° h o ' v m » -n i v > ^ Vu 5^] t )c ; iaq i jpr* •• ^^c ;_„ -
 f i -- ^ * =; 
A . ; . a m " s a^tornex i^ a ~ \ s t a t e m e n t s a oc icc^ct; 
c 
I.. * i • icariL i ua . W i l l i a m ' s a t t o r n e y mar!0 T ^ ~i*i'm 
before thp * ^we? nat he had gi ven oral n o t i ^-s 
b e f i i i D i i I I 11 in i "i 11 i i n • i |J t M i 11 in l I l i a l I  M i'ii I mi mi II i II i n 11 
recommendation , i in though he filed a lengthy objection in 
court fs Judgment arqinnq that no such not JTP was necessary, 
The appeliari L"" . brie t also claims thai: RoseMai. y1 *. -iltorney 
stated to Judge Frederick at the hearing thai the iiuies uf the Third 
D i S" . i " i i II mi mi I  in o q i u i in n i l I h i ' i n j H I • | 11 mi 11 t I n ' i " D i i ii ii in , i i i mi in i in '" 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s hi b*:j in w r i t i n g .-Jiiil thai J u d g e F r e d e r i c k d i d uricif 
v. • - - f~ im^ o"»# nri the b e n c h hi read t h e ru l e 5 T h i s i g a i n is a [ a l s e 
stauem -. ::1 i, i:i : • s u p p o r t ii i :t the recor c:i . p l a i nLi LI «» attorney 
did not order a transcript of the hearing before Judge Frederick and 
is now making misrepresentations as to what would be included in 
that transcript. 
Whether the objections to the commissioner's ruling must be in 
writing or may be oralf the record clearly shows that William's 
attorney did not give any notice to the commissioner and to RoseMary 
and her attorney that he objected to the commissioner's recommenda-
tions. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 8 (d) of the Rules of the Third 
Judicial District Court, William is deemed to have consented to 
Commissioner Peuler's recommendations and this Court should affirm 
the Judgment entered by Judge Frederick in accordance with those 
recommendations. 
POINT II 
THE FILING OF INTERROGATORIES BY WILLIAM'S 
ATTORNEY DID NOT CONSTITUTE NOTICE OF WILLIAM'S 
REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMEN-
DATION. 
William's attorney argues that his filing of interrogatories 
after the hearing before Commissioner Peuler constituted notice that 
he would not accept Commissioner Peuler's recommendation. William's 
attorney does not claim that the answers to interrogatories contained 
any notice that he would not accept the recommendations of the 
commissioner, but he seems to be arguing that RoseMary's attorney 
should have known that he intended to reject the commissioner's 
recommendations because he was still pursuing discovery. 
Neither the Interrogatories nor the Answers to Interrogatories 
are part of the record but William's attorney has attached a copy of 
the Answers to Interrogatories to his brief. Since the Answers to 
Interrogatories are not a part of the record they should not be 
con s I de r ed by 1: h i s Cour t b \ 11 i t i s c] e a r t ha t the r e i s no th i ng i n 
the Answer s to Interrogatories whicl 1 wou 1 d give not i < ::e tl la I : Wi 1 1 ii am 
did not intend to accept Commissioner Peul e r 1 s recommendations. The 
par: ties are free to conduct discovery at ai ly time. There is no reason 
to ass ume tha t the £ i ] i ng o I: i n te r roga to r i e s i nd i c a te s a pa r ty i s 
not wi 1 1 Ing t o a c c e p t tl: le COIIIII i s s i o n e r ' ' s recommei idat i' oi is , a i: i :I i t 
c e r t a i n l y wou 1 d not c o n s t i t u t e n o t i c e of sucI: I i I o n - a c c e p t a n c e , 
POINT I I I 
WILLIAM'S BRIEF INCLUDES REPRESENTATIONS OP FACT 
WHICH ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND AFFIDA-
VITS AND DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE 
. RECORD, ALL OF WHICH SHOULD BE STRICKEN. 
William's brief I ncludes numerous representations h] ? Wi 1 ] i am1 s 
attorney a bo ut h i s a 1 ] e ged s ta t erne nt s i i I ope n c o ur na 
before Commissioner Peuler, none of wh ich a re supports . he record 
c 11 I € t r a i: :t s c i: iii p t • ::  f t h s • I if i II ] :ii am' s a 
made representations about the hearing before Judge rredei - -K * . :. 
p r o d uc i ng a t :i: a n s c r i p t o f t h e r e c o r d o r a ny o t h e r -i1 ^ r< * * • - -• 
s t a t erne n+' s , A ] ] o f 11 I e s t a t erne n t s o I W i 1 "I i am' ' s a t: 
s tr i c k e n . 
T h P > i 1 1 > f \ 1 • 1 1 1 1 1 in 11 in 1 i ! i in i l l " ! i i | I  i in mi in i in I i I  in i < , i r | i ' h H i , i f !: 1 1 i i 11 in I f 
Commissioner Sandra Peuiei which is attached Lu the briel and is not 
a par: * * -i Th • - iffidavi - *; i > ^rrirkv*r. 
ca? a s1 n -.-•,'- - brief ?op * -everai r«-al estate 
contract dc uments uuae ui wluun weie pLtibenteu i - ^ jwer court 
an^ n/^ r»^  rs< , v^-o part of +-^^ recor'q Al1 ** «-T^ documents 
should be stricken and not considered by the Court. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT'S ORDER IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF COMMISSIONER PEULER. 
William's brief argues that Judge Frederick's Judgment exceeds 
and modifies the recommendations of Commissioner Peuler. He argues 
that the award of $150 attorney's fees was not consistent with 
Commissioner Peuler's recommendations and that Commissioner Peuler's 
recommendations did not require defendant to give plaintiff a mortgage 
or trust deed on the Evanston property in the amount of the first 
mortgage on plaintiff's house. 
It is incredible that plaintiff would argue that the Court 
improperly awarded $150 attorney's fees to RoseMary. RoseMary's 
attorney filed an affidavit establishing reasonable attorney's fees 
in the sum of $lf700 and it was only upon the recommendation of 
Commissioner Peuler that that sum was reduced to $150. Commissioner 
Peuler filled in the award of attorney's fees in the sum of $150 and 
signed her approval to the order which was later signed by Judge 
Frederick. An award of $150 attorney's fee was more than adequately 
supported by the record and the award should have been much higher. 
If anyone has reason to complain about the award of attorney's fees 
it is RoseMary. 
With regard to the order that William give RoseMary a mortgage 
or trust deed on the Evanston property in the amount of the first 
mortgage on plaintiff's house, Commissioner Peuler very clearly 
recommended that William give RoseMary that mortgage or trust deed. 
The original Decree of Divorce which was signed on June 23, 19 81f 
r - ** " "> *• '*• ~ ~i ~ ^* I ^ " T * - » r r t rus t - de^d on H I P E v a n s t o n 
p r o p e j , r :he b e n e f i t . ,, :'..*. " ' h>< amount i i ii I i 
mor^qaae »r. .ospMa' f)ousfj. Commiss ioner P e u l e r ' s recoiruripr.-Li 11 on 
a . , ' l„„ ' • ••- " " : 
And in terms of the mortgage that the div 
decree required him to do, the decree requnea 
him to give her a mortgage on the real property, 
my belief about that would be that he should be 
required to do that, and if the plaintiff feels 
that there is sufficient equity there to protect 
her, I think at that point, she's probably going • 
to have to come I n and ask that the decree be 
•' '•
 ;
 modi fied CR 2:39 ) 
:'" ' '- Commissioner Peuler had no doubt that Wil 1 iam should be required 
to execute a mortqaqe or trust" deed on Hie Evanston property, as 
required by the o r i g u m l Decree ot Di\ u r o 1 . Il1" I IN-" . i s s u e i n I III In «n m m in.) 
before Commissioner Peuler was whether Wil 1 iam should be r eqi i i red 
t ' tie El i i'i Dtl ler tj : m is t: ::le< = d :: i: l t!l: i€ Mi d\ a 1 e pr Dperty because he had 
subsequently mortgaged the Evanston property so there wa s no val ue 
i n i t 11 w a, s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e M i d v a 1 e p rope r t y t h a t C o mm i s j s o n e r 
t o modify t he o r i g i rial d e c r e e . A 1 1 Commissioner Peu le r f s r til i ng d id 
v ' uerms UJL unts ujngxiicix aeo rec which Wil l iam nad 
l ' j t I V . / I t t C i O l l i ' , 
Commiss ione r P e u l e r , * i t.r- • ?uosed : .'Unit-- * b e f o r -
v > 
form., The J udgment wab r u i i y . . i i i iorn i i : v * ,:_- , jiruiii.-jsion^i r^unzit s 
recommendations. 
PUJNT J 
THE JUDGMENT WAS CORRECT ON THE MERITS. 
Although the only proper issue on this appeal is whether William 
failed to give notice of objections within the time required by Rule 
8 (d) of the Rules of the Third Judicial District Court, we are 
compelled to point out that Commissioner Peuler' s decision was correct 
on the merits. 
The divorce decree in this case was entered on June 23, 19 81. 
At the time of the divorce, the parties owned property having a value 
of over $780,000. In order to ensure that William could pay child 
support payments, RoseMary agreed to take only the residence in 
Holladay, which had a value of about $110,000, and give William all 
of the rental properties. The decree required that William pay the 
first mortgage on the residence, having a balance of approximately 
$52,800 and monthly payments of approximately $578. The decree 
specifically stated that this was property awarded to RoseMary and 
that RoseMary would be entitled to only $1 per year in alimony. 
Just after the divorce decree was entered, RoseMary sold the 
residence in Holladay on contract. The contract provided for a down 
payment and for the buyers to make payments to RoseMary. The buyers 
did not assume the mortgage on the property and RoseMary is still 
liable for those payments. 
With a down payment from the sale of the residence in Holladay, 
RoseMary purchased a condominium in St. George, Utah, in approximately 
June, 19 82. She used the payments from the property in Holladay to 
make the payments on the condominium. William continued to make the 
property settlement payments to RoseMary for over one year after she 
moved into the condominium but refused to continue making the payments 
when RoseMary remarried in 1983. As a result of William's refusal 
to make the property settlements, RoseMary was unable to make the 
payments on her condominium and she lost it. William now owns all of 
the other property and RoseMary has lost her share of the property 
because William refused to make the property settlement payments 
required under the contract. 
William is now taking the position that he should not have to 
pay RoseMary anything since her remarriage because the property 
settlement payments under the divorce decree were actually alimonyf 
even though the divorce decree specifically provided that she would 
only receive $1 per year in alimony. William has caused RoseMary 
to lose all of her property by failing to make the property settlement 
payments and he has refused to make the property settlement payments 
required under the decree of divorce for over two years. 
* RoseMary's situation is becoming desperate because of William's 
continual refusal to abide by the terms of the divorce decree and 
because of the continual delays and legal expenses caused by actions 
by William's attorney. 
RoseMary is clearly entitled to the sums awarded by the Judgment 
entered by Judge Frederick and the time has come for William to pay 
his just due. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the plaintiff-respondent, 
RoseMary Wiscombe, respectfully submits that the Judgment on Order 
to Show Cause entered by Judge Frederick should be affirmed. 
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DATED this C3 day of December, 19 85. 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Aaron Alma Nelson ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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